AMAZON.FR · NICHE ANALYSED

Energy gels

Market study — competition, size, entry conditions

⚠ Not recommended — No Go

Attractive on paper — good volume, fast growth — but the market is **already taken**. A few brands make most of the sales, and **Amazon sells many of those brands itself**. For a new seller, the chance of building a profitable position is low.

MARKET	DEMAND	TOP SELLER	MEASURED SCOPE
€566k	+80%	SiS · 37%	70 variants

PREPARED BY SOUFYANE BERKANI — FOUNDER, ARGUS

TRAILING 12-MONTH WINDOW · ED. 2026-06-24

The essentials

00

THE VERDICT AND KEY NUMBERS, FOR ANYONE WITH JUST TWO MINUTES

⚠ Not recommended — No Go

On paper, this niche has everything: volume, growth, few returns, decent margins. But the market is **already taken** — a few established brands make most of the sales, and **Amazon itself sells a growing share**. A new seller is not just facing "the market". It is facing positions that are already filled, and Amazon as one of the sellers. We advise against entering.

REVENUE **€566k**	DEMAND (SEARCHES) **167k** +80%	TOP TWO BRANDS **67%**	TOP-SELLER SHARE **37%** of market
SOLD BY AMAZON (1P) **46%** of market	HANDICAP VS AMAZON **~32%** of price	MEDIAN RATING **4.4★**	EST. MARGIN (BEFORE ADS) **33–43%**

Figures cover the last 12 months (to 22/06/2026) unless stated otherwise. "1P" = products sold directly by Amazon: Amazon buys the brand wholesale and resells it itself (Vendor).

The market looks good. ~€566k a year, strong and fast-growing demand (~167,000 searches a year, +80% in one year), very few returns, decent margins. On paper, an open door.

But it is already taken. Over the year, two brands — Science in Sport and TA — make **67% of sales** on their own. More importantly, **Amazon sells a large share itself**: 46% over the year, and up to 63% in the last thirty days. It is growing fast, reselling the brands it lists in the most common price range (€20–40). A third-party seller starts with a **~32% cost handicap** that Amazon does not pay itself, plus constant ad pressure (~74% of listings are sponsored).

Only one space works for third parties: strong premium products above €40, where Amazon and the price war are not present — like Maurten (one product, 4.7★), or the high end of Science in Sport. But **this is not an easy way in**. It needs a brand people already want, a high rating, and a permanent ad budget.

↳ And if you still want to try?

You would need all of these at once — and even then, **nothing is guaranteed**: a truly different product (formula, format, or use), a premium price > €40 outside Amazon's range, a permanent ad budget, full food compliance (expiry dates, claims), and enough visibility to stand out where 95% of clicks already go to the top brands. The likely gain does not justify the effort. **Our recommendation stands: do not enter.**

01

Scope & reliability

WHAT THE STUDY COVERS — AND WHY YOU CAN TRUST IT

On Amazon, almost all sales for a search term happen on the **first page of results**. So this study starts from the first page for “energy gel”, and then applies two filters.

The first filter, for **comparability**, keeps only real energy gels that can be compared with each other. It removes the noise (chews, fruit pastes, bars, electrolyte tablets) that shows up on the keyword but is not part of this market. The second filter, **economic**, keeps only the products whose sales we can actually measure.

After these filters, here is the final scope. Its **70 measurable variants** are the basis for every figure in this report:

PRODUCTS	VARIANTS	MEASURABLE	ACTIVE BRANDS
39	87	70	12

Some figures also come from Amazon’s **Opportunity Explorer**, the seller-side tool that measures activity in a niche. Its scope is **wider** than ours, but it overlaps closely with our selection and follows our market well. We use it as a guide, not as our main source.



Our selection covers two-thirds of the clicks in the niche as Amazon defines it. The rest goes to products off the first page, or to products we removed because they are not comparable (chews, bars, electrolyte tablets).

* Non-measurable products (17 active variants with no usable sales history — new or reworked listings) are left out of the **calculations only, not the report**. We show them without a figure, and never count them as zero sales.

02

Market size & momentum

WHAT THE MARKET IS WORTH, AND HOW FAST IT MOVES

Over twelve months, the energy-gel market is worth **€566,000**, from **22,247 units** sold. Over the last thirty days, it runs at about **€85,000**. We calculate every figure **variant by variant** — the real sales of each comparable product, not a brand's whole range added together.

MARKET · 12 MONTHS	RUN RATE · 30 D	UNITS · 12 MONTHS
€566k	€85k	22,247

ESTIMATED MONTHLY REVENUE — 24 MONTHS (€K)



Estimated from sales history. The line follows demand, which is up sharply over the year (§8). The season peaks in spring (runners preparing for races) — the orange bar marks the highest month.

Demand is strong — and growing

This is the big difference from many mature niches: demand is **rising**. On the search terms that define the niche, Amazon measures **+80% more searches** in one year, and the growth is broad — across most terms (detail in §8). Endurance sport — running, trail, cycling, triathlon — drives the category.

Watch out: products often go out of stock

At any moment, more than one product in five — about **22%** — is **out of stock**. This can mean two things: demand is higher than supply (an opening for a reliable seller), but also that stock is hard to manage — normal for a food product with a short expiry date (§9).

> ▲ **What this means**
>
> This is an established, growing niche — a good starting point. But size alone does not tell you if there is room. That depends on who holds the market (§3).

03

Concentration & structure

WHO HOLDS THE MARKET — AND HOW TIGHTLY

A big market is not the same as an open one. What matters is who holds it. Over the year, two brands — **Science in Sport and TA Energy** — take **67%** of sales on their own, and the top three take **84%.** The concentration index is **0.26**: a concentrated market — an oligopoly.

HHI INDEX	TOP 2 BRANDS	TOP-SELLER SHARE
0.26	67%	37%

DEGREE OF MARKET CONCENTRATION (HHI INDEX)



The HHI index measures concentration. Near 0, the market is shared between many sellers; near 1, one seller dominates. At 0.26, energy gels are clearly concentrated.

MARKET SHARE BY BRAND, AND CUMULATIVE — 12 MONTHS



"Cumulative" column: this brand's share plus all the brands above it. Just three names cover 84% of the market.

The key point: who sells, and for how long

Beyond the brands, you have to look at **who** makes the sale. On Amazon there are two types of seller: **third-party sellers (3P)**, who sell through the marketplace, and **Amazon first-party (1P)**, where Amazon buys a brand wholesale and resells it itself ("Dispatched and sold by Amazon" — by invitation). This is where the market is changing fast:

WHO SELLS: AMAZON FIRST-PARTY (1P) VS THIRD-PARTY SELLERS (3P)



Over the year, third parties are the majority (54%). Over thirty days, Amazon first-party jumps to 63% — a recent change, not the full-year picture.

Two barriers, not one. Over the **year**, the market is held by the **brands** (SiS, Maurten). Over the **last thirty days**, Amazon first-party **grows fast** (63%), through TA and Powerbar, which it sells itself. A new seller faces both — the strong existing brands *and* the growing share sold by Amazon. The only area that avoids both: differentiated premium products (§5, §10).

Note — 17 active variants we cannot measure (new listings) are left out of the calculation, never counted as zero. The effect on the results is small.

04

Competitor profiles — the leaders

WHY EACH IS A LEADER — AND WHAT CHANGED IN 2026

Price **does not explain** who leads: the cheapest per litre (SiS, Powerbar) and the most expensive (Maurten) are all leaders. There are two ways to win — the **Amazon channel (1P)** and a **strong brand (3P)** — and in recent months the challengers are **growing** while the leader falls back.

Science in Sport

#1 · 37%

THIRD-PARTY SELLER (3P)

Revenue 12m	€210k · 37%
Top product	20 × 60 ml · €1.50/gel



Sales/mo · peaks in March, then dips

A third-party seller, **without Amazon**, and still #1: it is the **best-known brand** — its own demand, plus the widest range (16 listings), at the best price (€1.50/gel). Its ~15,000 reviews come from **years of sales**, they are not the reason it leads (rating 4.2★). The only leader **losing share** in 2026.

TA Energy

#2 · 30%

SOLD BY AMAZON (1P)

Revenue 12m	€167k · 30%
Top product	12 × 40 ml · €2.50/gel



Sales/mo · sharply accelerating

A gel that is **expensive per litre** (2.5× SiS), ~60 reviews: neither price nor reviews explain it. **Amazon sells it** and promotes it (96% of revenue on one listing). The 1P advantage is the extra margin that pays for visibility, not a low price.

Powerbar

#3 · 17%

SOLD BY AMAZON (1P)

Revenue 12m	€96k · 17%
Top product	12 × 67 ml · €1.67/gel



Sales/mo · rising fast

Also sold by Amazon, but uses a **low entry price**: €19.99, the largest gels (67 ml). Amazon's 1P power **+** a low price. Growing fast in early 2026.

Maurten

#4 · 8%

THIRD-PARTY SELLER (3P)

Revenue 12m	€47k · 8%
Top product	12 × 40 g · €3.41/gel



Sales/mo · climbing steadily

The most expensive of all (~€85/kg), one product, **patented hydrogel**. Wins a small premium segment on technology and a top reputation, not on price.

Estimated monthly sales (H10), Nov 2025 → May 2026 — the period where all four leaders have reliable data. Price per gel = pack price ÷ number of gels; pack sizes checked on the product images (TA 40 ml, Maurten 40 g "Pack of 12").

▲ What this means

Two ways to win, and **neither is price**. The **Amazon 1P channel** (TA, Powerbar): the ~32% fee saving pays for visibility, not a discount for the buyer. A **strong brand, 3P**: SiS (wide range, long history), Maurten (patented product). The 2026 trend: the three challengers are growing, SiS is falling back — share is moving to 1P and premium. For a normal new seller, none of these is within reach.

05

Price & positioning

AT WHAT PRICE THE NICHE SELLS — AND WHY NO PRICE IS A DOORWAY

Pack sizes range from a single dose (~€1.65) to a large pack (€89), so list prices are only comparable per unit. Per gel, the market sells between **€1.50 and €3.40**. The median listing is **€32**, and importantly **85% of revenue is under €40** a pack. There are three price levels — and none is an easy way in.

PRICE SEGMENT	SHARE OF REVENUE	WHO BANKS IT	FOR A THIRD-PARTY ENTRANT?
Under €20 — value packs	22%	**Amazon 1P** 54% · third parties 46% (Powerbar, SiS)	No — you fight on volume against Amazon's lower cost
€20–40 — the core	**63%**	**Amazon 1P** 64% · **SiS** 36%	**Very hard** — Amazon *and* the strong SiS brand
Over €40 — premium	15%	**99% third parties** (Maurten, SiS, Precision)	**The only space without Amazon** — but small, needs a real product

REVENUE BY PRICE SEGMENT, AND WHO SELLS IT



The €20-40 core carries 63% of revenue and is **mixed**: Amazon leads (64%), but one established third party – SiS – holds the other 36%. Premium (> €40) is the **only space without Amazon** (99% third parties, Maurten first) – but it is only 15% of the market.

▲ Price is not a weapon — it is a trap

Lower your price and you face Amazon's ~32% cost advantage, across the 85% of the market under €40. **Go premium** and you are in the only space without Amazon — but it is only 15%, and you win on the **product** (Maurten's patented hydrogel), not on a high price. The core itself? A third party can sell there — but only if you are **SiS**, with a wide range and ~15,000 reviews a new seller does not have. No level is easy to enter.

06

Profitability & unit economics

WHAT THE SELLER KEEPS — AND THE STRUCTURAL HANDICAP VS AMAZON

If you can sell, the economics are decent — but the playing field is not level. On €100 of revenue (before tax), Amazon fees take **~32%**. Take off a product cost of about **25–35%** (an estimate — we have no supplier quote) and you keep a **margin of about 33–43%**, before advertising. Decent — but that is not the problem. The problem is that **Amazon does not charge itself** the ~32% it charges a third-party seller.

EST. MARGIN (BEFORE ADS)	PRODUCT COST (ASSUMPTION)	HANDICAP VS AMAZON	VAT · FOOD
33–43%	25–35%	~32%	5.5%

PER €100 OF REVENUE (EX-VAT): WHERE THE MONEY GOES



Product-cost estimate: 25–35% of revenue before tax (to be confirmed by a supplier quote). The margin is **before advertising**, and ads are not optional: **~74% of listings are sponsored** and 95% of clicks go to the top 5 brands. So being seen needs a large ad budget, which reduces that 33–43%. And on the same product sold 1P, Amazon does not pay the ~32% fees: it can sell **~32% cheaper at the same margin**.

Fees are shown before VAT. For a VAT-registered seller, the VAT on Amazon's fees (referral, logistics) is refundable, so the real cost is the amount before VAT. Revenue is also counted before VAT, to be consistent.

⚠ An uneven playing field

In a normal “open” niche, every seller pays the same ~32% in fees. Here, on the listings Amazon sells 1P, the field is **tilted in Amazon’s favour**: a third party does not win the Buy Box and cannot match the price. You cannot manage this disadvantage — you have to **avoid it**, with a product Amazon does not sell.

07

Quality, reviews & entry barrier

WHAT IT TAKES TO EXIST AGAINST THE INCUMBENTS

Reviews matter — but not the way most people think. Below ~100, they reassure the buyer. Above that, more reviews **stop making a difference** (200 or 15,000, the buyer cannot tell). A large number of reviews mostly **comes from years of sales:** the #1 has the most because it has sold the most for a long time — not the other way around. What really decides the sale is the **average rating** — and here, the leader is at the bottom.

AVERAGE RATING BY BRAND (4.0–5.0★) — NUMBER OF REVIEWS SHOWN NEXT TO IT



The number of reviews (from ~60 to ~15,000 — a 250× difference) **does not match** the rating. Science in Sport, #1 in the market with ~15,000 reviews, only reaches **4.2★** — below the median. The best ratings belong to small brands: Maurten (4.7) and Precision (4.8).

Review count is a result, not a tool. Proof: TA has ~30% of the market with **~60 reviews** — the Amazon channel gives it at once the visibility SiS took years to build. SiS's 15,000 reviews come from that long history: they reassure buyers, but a new seller does **not need to catch up**. About 150 reviews and a rating of 4.6★ or more pass the trust level — a better quality signal than the leader (4.2★).

MARKET MEDIAN RATING	#1 RATING (SiS)	CLICKS → TOP 5 BRANDS	SUCCESSFUL ENTRANTS · 2 YEARS
4.4★	4.2★ below median	95%	≤ 2

⚠ The barrier is visibility — not reviews

You can reach the review level in a few months. What you cannot catch up is **visibility** and **brand demand**. 95% of clicks go to the five top brands, and **2 or fewer new products** launched successfully in two years (88 weeks out of 104 at zero). The barrier is the **Amazon channel** (TA) and the age of the brands (SiS) — a good, well-rated product is not enough if no one sees it.

08

Demand: searches, keywords & seasonality

HOW MANY CUSTOMERS SEARCH, WITH WHAT WORDS, AT WHAT TIMES

Demand is **real, wide and growing fast** — but the keywords are **few** and mostly held by brands. Two questions for a new seller: how many people search, and when; and which words really win the sale.

DEMAND SIZE & SEASONALITY

The niche has **~167,000 searches a year** (~13,900 a month) and is **growing +80% year on year** — unusual and positive. The seasonality is clear.

NICHE SEARCHES — ACTUAL WEEKLY VOLUME, 2 YEARS



Real weekly search volume over two years: **+80% year on year**, with clear seasonality — **a peak in April–May** (race season) and a low point in late December. A launch should be **ready before spring**.

THE KEYWORDS THAT MAKE THE SALE

On **contestable** search terms (generic, no brand), a new seller can hope to rank. One main term leads — **"gel énergétique"** — followed by a long tail of running / race / trail / cycling terms. Most of the volume is on a few words.

CONTESTABLE GENERIC KEYWORDS — SEARCHES/MONTH



The terms really open to a new seller add up to **~7,700 searches a month**, a quarter of them on "gel énergétique" alone. The **other 12** generic terms (gel trail, energy gel, gel marathon…) are a **spread-out long tail** — and all of them are full of ads (see below).

CONTESTABLE CORE (GENERIC)	SHARE OF CORE TIED TO A BRAND	HEAD TERM	LONG TAIL
~7,700 searches/mo	**~57%**	**1,910** “gel énergétique”/mo	**88** queries → a single listing

~57% of the core is already tied to a brand name (TA, Maurten, SiS, Overstim, Isostar, Powerbar): volume already taken by the top brands. A new seller can only reach it by **paying for ads on competitor brand names**, at a high price. The demand you can really target is the generic core above — and it is small.

ADVERTISING PRESSURE — SHARE OF LISTINGS THAT ARE ADS



~74% of listings are ads: paying to reach page 1 is a permanent cost in this niche, not an option — and it costs more for a third party, who is already 32 points behind.

What this means for a new seller. The open terms are **few** — one main term, then a spread-out tail (88 terms each lead to only one listing) — and more than half of the core's volume is **tied to brands**. All of it under **~74% ads**: you pay for page 1, all the time. With the visibility barrier (§7), the cost to win a generic keyword is **high and ongoing**.

09

Risks, compliance & returns

WHAT CAN BLOCK, SUSPEND OR MAKE THE NICHE UNWINNABLE

Risk #1 — built-in: Amazon sells almost half the market itself (1P)

This is **the** main risk in this niche, and it comes from the cost structure (§6). **~46% of revenue** — and **63% in the last thirty days** — is sold by **Amazon itself**, including the market's #2 (TA) and Powerbar. On these products, Amazon does not pay the ~32% marketplace fees that a third party pays. So it can sell at a lower price and still make money, it keeps the Buy Box, and a similar third-party product **simply cannot compete**. You cannot manage this risk — you have to **avoid it**, with a product Amazon does not sell.

SHARE SOLD BY AMAZON FIRST-PARTY (1P), BY PRICE



Amazon-1P controls the **€30–40** core (86%) and the low end, but **disappears above €40** (1%). Above €40, its 32-point cost gap no longer works against it. This is the **only price range it does not control** — the space for a premium new seller (§10).

The rule to follow: **check how much Amazon sells 1P before you enter**, and choose a sub-niche it does not stock. Note: the #1, Science in Sport, is itself a **third-party** seller. So the "brand barrier" (SiS, over the year) and the "1P barrier" (Amazon, right now) are **two separate barriers**, and a new seller faces both (§5).

What returns say about the product

Returns are **very low** — among the lowest we measure, nothing like clothing or electronics — which makes sense for a food product you eat: you do not return an opened gel. A real advantage: little customer service, few refunds. *Amazon's return-rate number should only be read as a rough level (the way it is calculated is not documented, and the scope is narrow); it is useful to compare niches with each other — and on that scale, energy gels have very few returns.*

Compliance — this is a food product

The rules are stricter than for a cosmetic. The usual points to check in this category (general background, not part of this study's data):

- ☐ **Food labelling** (INCO Regulation 1169/2011): nutrition information, ingredients, allergens; DGCCRF declaration for supplements.
- ☐ **Expiry-date management (best-before / use-by)** — the hard part: Amazon removes stock as the date gets close. Managing stock rotation is a real risk, especially for a seasonal product.
- ☐ **Regulated claims** (EU 1924/2006): words like "energy", "endurance", "recovery" must follow the approved wording; medical claims are not allowed.
- ☐ **VAT 5.5%** (food product) — confirmed, good for the margin, already included in the figures.
- ☐ **Brand-name availability** (INPI/EUIPO) — check before you invest; not covered here.

Market risks, most important first

- ☐ **Amazon's 1P barrier** — the main, built-in risk; only avoided in **premium > €40**.
- ☐ **Buyers trust known brands** — athletes choose a brand they trust (easy to digest, good performance); hard to enter as an unknown brand.
- ☐ **Constant ad pressure (~74%)** — an unavoidable cost, worse for a third party.
- ☐ **Stock & seasonality** — frequent stockouts + short expiry dates + seasonal demand (Apr–May peak) = difficult logistics; running out during the peak season costs a large part of the year.

Verdict & entry conditions

SHOULD YOU GO IN — WHY WE ADVISE AGAINST, AND THE BAR TO PROCEED ANYWAY

10

⚠ **Not recommended — No Go**

For a normal new seller — reselling, copy products, white-label — the answer is **no**. The niche is growing, but it is **already taken**: a few established brands and Amazon itself make most of the sales. The only exception — a **truly different** product, sold at a **premium above €40** — is small and hard to do.

What looks good — and why it is a trap

The market looks good: **~€566k a year**, **+80%** growth, very few returns, decent margins (~33–43% of revenue before tax). On paper, an open door. And that is exactly the trap: these signs look good, but they describe a market that is **already taken**.

Why we advise against

The market is **concentrated** (two brands = 67%) and held by **two barriers at once**. The **established brands** have the trust of a category where athletes choose what is proven — **95% of clicks** go to the top 5. And **Amazon itself** sells 46% of the market directly (63% over the last thirty days), controlling the €30–40 core (86%), where a third party starts **~32% behind on cost** that Amazon does not charge itself. The result is clear: **2 or fewer new products** launched successfully in two years (88 weeks out of 104 at zero), all under **~74% ad pressure**. The part you can really win is not €566k — it is the premium slice, **only 15% of the market**.

The only exception — small and hard

Only one area avoids both barriers: **a very different premium product, above €40**, where Amazon is almost absent (1% of sales) and there is no price war. This is **Maurten**'s position — 8% of the market with one product, 4.7★ — but it is based on a real **patented** product, not a generic white-label gel. The other options are dead ends for a small seller: building a **full brand range** (the Science in Sport model) is slow and expensive; selling “what Amazon does not stock” (organic, vegan, niche formats) is **a short-term tactic that keeps changing**, not a strategy.

If you proceed anyway: the bar to clear

You need **all** of these conditions — miss one and it fails; and even with all of them, **nothing is guaranteed**:

01 **A truly different product, sold > €40** — in formula, format, or use. That is what takes you out of Amazon's range; a standard gel is not enough.

02 **A sub-niche Amazon does not sell 1P** — check this before you invest; it is the most important thing to check.

03 **A permanent ad budget from day one** (~74% of listings are ads) — an ongoing cost, not just a launch cost.

04 **Full food compliance** — labelling, claims, and above all expiry-date rotation.

05 **A launch ready before spring** — so you are ready for the race season; running out of stock in season costs a large part of the year.

06 **A high rating (4.6★ or more)** with ~100–150 reviews — beyond that, the number of reviews no longer matters; the rating is what decides (leader SiS is only 4.2★).

The likely return does not justify the effort. **Our recommendation: do not enter.**

What this study does not cover, and what to check before a final GO: the real supplier cost (COGS — we assumed 25–35% of revenue before tax, to be confirmed by a quote) and the supply chain; real advertising costs (CPC); the exact month-by-month seasonal pattern (can be taken from the OE data); the legal availability of the brand name; and demand outside Amazon (sports shops, D2C, specialist retailers).

APPENDICES

Measurable variants, ranked by sales

RANKED BY 30-DAY REVENUE · "1P" = SOLD BY AMAZON · "3P" = THIRD PARTY

#	BRAND	ASIN	AVG PRICE 30D	UNITS 30D	REVENUE 30D	SOLD BY
1	TA Energy	B0CCPTGCTC	€30.00	614	€18,420	1P
2	Maurten	B07H319S3V	€40.92	233	€9,534	3P
3	Powerbar	B0D7W2YVHX	€26.76	298	€7,973	1P
4	Powerbar	B0C5HQVMQS	€23.70	252	€5,973	1P
5	TA Energy	B0CCPR8SBL	€30.00	196	€5,880	1P
6	TA Energy	B0FQCNYP6T	€30.00	190	€5,699	1P
7	Science in Sport	B0979ZYJYQ	€60.80	64	€3,891	3P
8	NUTRIPURE	B0FFH7KXS1	€30.90	66	€2,039	3P
9	Vitastrong	B0FN9KGQV3	€33.90	59	€2,000	3P
10	Isostar	B0036BCYD6	€16.69	113	€1,886	1P

70 measurable variants in total (top 10 shown above); 17 active variants we could not measure (no usable history) — left out of the calculations, never counted as zero. Units and revenue: last 30 days.

Glossary

TERM	DEFINITION
1P / Vendor ("sold by Amazon")	Amazon buys a brand wholesale and resells it itself. By invitation. Not to be confused with a private label or a third-party seller.
3P / Seller	Third-party seller via the marketplace; pays referral fee + FBA logistics fees.
Buy Box	The default offer on a listing (the "Add to Basket" button). A 1P offer almost always wins it.
HHI	Concentration index (sum of squared shares). Above 0.25: concentrated market.
Opportunity Explorer (OE)	Amazon Seller Central tool: Amazon's server-side data on a niche (searches, clicks, conversions, returns).
Measurable variant / n.m.	A variant whose sales history does (or does not) allow a calculation. A non-measurable variant is shown, but never counted as zero.

Sources & extraction dates

SOURCE	DATA	EXTRACTION
Amazon Marketplace	Page 1, product listings (price, ratings, reviews, seller, formats) — logged-out capture + FR delivery for unbiased consumer prices	17–19 June 2026
Helium 10	Estimated sales histories (variant level), sales rank	17–18 June 2026
Helium 10 — Cerebro	Organic positioning of the market leaders, search volumes	17 June 2026
Amazon Opportunity Explorer	Niche “gel énergétique”: 2-year searches, queries, volumes, returns (Amazon server data)	17 June 2026

Method

Revenue is calculated **variant by variant**: estimated daily sales (Helium 10) × the price on each day (including promotions), over the period shown. The “avg price 30d” in Appendix A is this **real selling price** (revenue ÷ units sold) — it can be different from today’s listed price if the listing was on promotion. Opportunity Explorer figures are **Amazon’s own server data** (read directly, not estimated); per-variant sales are **estimates**, checked against each other and against Amazon’s data. Whether a listing is Amazon 1P or third-party is read directly on each page. We use two periods: **12 months** (stable across seasons, the main view) and **30 days** (the recent trend). When the two differ, we point it out and explain it, instead of hiding it.